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1. George F. Break
The role of government during the postwar period has been the subject
of much passionate debate and has greatly enlivened the lecture, cock-
tail, and many other circuits too numerous to mention. The purpose of
this paper is not to extend those discussions of what should be done
about the government, or to add to the already extensive analyses of
why governments grow. Rather it is the more sober one of taking a close
look at the revenues and expenditures of United States governments
during the past thirty years or so in order to identify the main structural
changes that may have occurred during that period. Some of these
changes, of course, are already well-known and broadly recognized,
others may be less conspicuous, and still others may call forth dispute
and discussion.
The focus throughout will be on what may be termed the official fiscal
record of governmental spending and taxing. Two sources of data are
available for this purpose—the national income and product accounts
(NIPA) and the Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances series
(BOC:GF). For the federal government, in addition, there is the annual
budget document and the accompanying special analyses. These are the
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statistical series studied, for what they do show, for what they don't
show, and for what they could show with suitable adjustments.
9.1 Broad Expenditure Changes
By any of the standard measures, government expenditures have
grown significantly during the postwar period. Table 9.1 summarizes
the official record for all levels of government together. Bureau of the
Census accounts show two broad expenditure measures, one covering
general government activities only (table 9.1, section A), and the other
adding to general expenditures those of public utilities, government
liquor stores, and insurance trust funds (table 9.1, section B). The na-
tional income and product accounts show one expenditure series (table
Table 9.1 Alternate Measures of Government Expenditure Growth during
the Postwar Period
Expenditure Measures
A. BOCGF General Expenditures*
1. Nominal dollars (billions)
2. Nominal dollars per capita
3. Billions of 1972 dollars*
4. Constant dollars per capita
5. Ratio of current dollar
expenditures to GNP
B. BOCGF Total Expenditures*
1. Nominal dollars (billions)
2. Nominal dollars per capita
3. Billions of 1972 dollarsb
4. Constant dollars per capita
5. Ratio of current dollar
expenditures to GNP
C. NIP A Total Expenditures*
1. Nominal dollars (billions)
2. Nominal dollars per capita
3. Billions of 1972 dollars*
4. Constant dollars per capita


























































aIntergovernmental expenditures are excluded from total expenditures of grantors.
bComputed using the NIPA implicit deflator for personal consumption expenditures.619 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
9.1, section C) which differs both in conceptual framework and in mea-
surement procedures from the BOC:GF series.
1
Absolute dollar expenditures (lines A.I, B.I, and C.I in table 9.1)
show the most striking, and least meaningful, picture of postwar govern-
ment growth. Clearly, one should make some allowance for the growth
of population (lines A.2, B.2, C.2), for increases in the general price
level (lines A.3, B.3, C.3), and for both together (lines A.4, B.4, C.4).
Neither adjustment, however, is free of ambiguities. Unchanged expen-
ditures on pure public goods yield unchanged public benefits to every-
one as population grows, though per capita expenditures thereon decline
steadily. Choice of the proper price index to convert different kinds of
government expenditures to constant-dollar terms is a complex issue that
will be discussed below. For the moment the best single measure of the
postwar growth in the total expenditures of all levels of government in
this country appears to be their ratio to gross national product (GNP)
with both the numerator and denominator measured in nominal (cur-
rent) dollars (lines A.5, B.5, C.5).
2
Relative to the size of the economy, then, all three broad expenditure
measures have grown significantly during the past thirty years. BOC
general expenditures rose from 19 percent of GNP in 1948 to 27 per-
cent in 1976-77, BOC total expenditures rose from 21 to 36 percent of
GNP during the same period, and NIPA expenditures increased from 18
to 32.5 percent of GNP between 1947 and 1977.
9.1.1 Economic Composition of Expenditures
The national income accounts distinguish five major economic cate-
gories of government expenditure. These show the different ways in
which the government goes about its many activities, as distinct from the
purposes or functions served thereby, to be discussed later. When the
economic structure of all government activities in the country in 1977
or 1978 is compared with the structures in 1948, little change shows up
(table 9.2). Purchases of goods and services were 63 percent of the total
in all three years, and a modest rise in transfer payments from 29 to 32
percent of the total was matched by an equal fall, from 8 to 4 percent,
in net interest payments. Indeed, for those who treat debt interest as one
kind of transfer payment there would be virtually no change in the eco-
nomic structure of government spending (see, for example, Rolph 1948;
1954).
When the federal and state-local sectors are separated, however, three
structural changes that merit attention show up. Federal purchases of
goods and services shrank from 43 to 33 percent of the budget, while
state-local resource using programs grew from 87 to 93 percent, solidify-
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federal transfer payments up from 33 to 40-41 percent of the total and
state-local transfer payments down from 17 to 11 percent. The third
change, which requires a three-level classification of governments to
reveal its full significance, was the rapid increase in federal grants-in-
aid, from 6 percent to nearly 17 percent of total federal expenditures.
A different kind of broad economic classification is given in BOC
data. There the distinction drawn is between the ordinary activities of
government financed by the general fund and the activities of various
kinds of public enterprises that have their own revenues and operate
more or less independently of the rest of government. These distinctions
are hard to make very precisely, but they are clearly an important part
of the postwar fiscal record.
3 Table 9.3 highlights one of the most widely
recognized and much discussed postwar structural changes in these
spending categories—the dramatic rise in insurance trust expenditures,
and the corresponding fall in general expenditures.
9.1.2 Government Output
Government purchases of goods and services are particularly impor-
tant economically because they, unlike the other categories shown in
table 9.2, are made to acquire for public use the services of scarce re-
sources. They are in Pigou's apt terminology "exhaustive expenditures."
4
As such, they are part of the economy's total productive activity, and
their ratio to GNP shows the government's share of total output during
each period.
The postwar record of that share, shown in table 9.4 and figure 9.1,
reveals two major structural changes during the period. The first con-
cerns the relation between the federal and state-local shares of total
government output. From approximate equality at the beginning of the
period, at 5.5 percent of GNP, the two sector shares first diverged
Table 9.3 Percentage Distributions of Total
Government Expenditures by Type,























Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1977 Census of Gov-
ernments, vol. 6, Topical Studies, no. 4, Historical Statistics
on Governmental Finances and Employment (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979).622 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
sharply in favor of the national government because of the Korean War.
In 1953, however, the federal share began a long-term decline that
reached equality with the rising state-local share in the late 1960s and
fell further and further behind thereafter. By 1978 federal output was
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Data from table 9.4.
ernments in the current-dollar series and 5 compared to 8 percent in
the constant-dollar measures.
The second major structural change was the replacement of public
sector growth exceeding the rate of growth of the total economy with
growth that fell behind it. For the federal government this change oc-
curred in 1953 in both the current- and constant-dollar series, and for
the state-local sector it occurred in 1975. For both levels combined the
postwar peak ratios to GNP were either in 1953 (constant-dollar mea-
sure) or in 1968 (current-dollar measure).
Official measures of government output are subject to a number of
well-known limitations (see, for example, Musgrave 1959; Shoup 1947
and 1969). Prominent among these, as far as any assessment of the role
of government during the postwar period is concerned, is the omission
of government capital formation. Estimates of expanded measures of
government product in the United States have recently been made avail-
able by Eisner and Nebhut (1979) for the 1946-76 period. Four major
imputations are made in their series:
1. Values of the services of government capital are measured as the
sum of an interest return and capital consumption allowances at
replacement cost
2. Uncompensated factor services, such as those provided by military
draftees and jurors, are added
3. Real gains and losses on government capital, or net revaluations,
are estimated
4. Work-related expenses, mainly travel expenses of government em-
ployees, are estimated and deducted
The resulting ratios to GNP, computed in 1972 dollars, are shown in
the first two columns of table 9.5, for government product both gross624 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
and net of real capital gains and losses on government capital (cur-
rent government product). When these two expanded product measures
are compared with the official NIPA series for GNP originating in gov-
ernment relative to GNP (both in 1972 dollars), shown in the third
column of table 9.5, two main differences stand out. One is the much
Table 9.5 Alternative Measures of Government
Product as a Percentage of GNP, in
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Sources: Eisner and Nebhut 1979, table 5, p. 42; Survey of
Current Business, vol. 56 (January 1976); vol. 59 (July 1979).625 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
higher postwar peaks at the very beginning of the period in the expanded
series. The other is the similarity in the timing of the peaks during the
latter part of the period in all three series, both in the late 1960s and in
1974-75.
9.1.3 Total Expenditures
When the focus is expanded from government purchases to total ex-
penditures, several complications arise. Whereas a G/GNP ratio has a
precise meaning—namely, the relative importance of a specific compo-
nent of total national output—a total expenditure ratio (E/GNP) does
not. Transfer expenditures are not necessarily less than GNP, and GNP
is only one of a number of measures of the size of the economy that
might be used to show the relative growth of government transfer pay-
ments. Nevertheless, GNP is the measure commonly used, and that
practice will be followed here.
Two more important difficulties in dealing with total government ex-
penditures arise from their heterogeneous character, which complicates
the derivation of constant-dollar measures, and their greater sensitivity
to economic fluctuations, which may mean that trends are obscured in
unadjusted data.
Constant-Dollar Adjustments
Arriving at a good set of constant-dollar adjustments is mainly a prob-
lem of measurement for government output expenditures and mainly
a problem of choice for all other expenditures. The measurement prob-
lems, arising from the intangible nature of many governmental benefits
and services, are well known (see, however, Hulten 1979). For exam-
ple, to adopt a Baumol-type hypothesis of zero productivity growth in
the public sector (Baumol 1967), as is often done for simplicity, could
be regarded both as too pessimistic or too optimistic. Given a private
sector in which labor productivity and money wage rates rise steadily,
the lower the rate of productivity growth assumed in the derivation of
the constant-dollar government output series, the more rapid the increase
in the implicit price deflator for the public sector and the greater the
divergence between current- and constant-dollar government output mea-
sures. If, as the Baumol hypothesis would suggest, the relative price of
government output is rising steadily over time, the government's share
of national output will be shown to rise more rapidly by current- than
by constant-dollar measures. This, indeed, is the relation shown in table
9.4 above.
The critical question, of course, concerns the quality of the constant-
dollar series for government output. Criticizing the Canadian national
income accounts for implicitly assuming a zero rate of productivity
growth in the government sector, a rate which he regarded as too low,626 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
Stanbury (1973) computed the effects of different degrees of produc-
tivity understatement on the relative size of the public sector shown by
constant-dollar measures. His results, shown in table 9.6, clearly indicate
that constant-dollar government output shares must be interpreted with
great care. Since the base year used for the price adjustments was 1961,
earlier constant-dollar output shares (G'/GNP') are overstated and
later ones understated by any G' measure that uses too low a rate of
government output productivity growth. Whereas the Canadian national
income accounts, for example, showed a 1926-68 increase in the rela-
tive size of the government sector from 13.2 percent to 19.0 percent of
GNP, the true increase would have been from 7.3 percent to 21.1 per-
cent if the government sector had in fact experienced a 2 percent average
annual rate of productivity growth over that period.
NIPA measures of constant-dollar government purchases in this coun-
try are also based on an assumption of zero factor-productivity growth.
5
Use of this standard convention has produced significant differences in
the measured rates of price increase in the private and public sectors
during the postwar period. These are illustrated in the following tab-
ulation, which compares changes in the implicit price deflators for the
government sector as a whole (FSL), the federal sector (F) and the
state-local sector (SL) with the deflators for personal consumption ex-
penditures (PCE) and national income (NI).
Table 9.6 Productivity and the Relative Size of the Public Sector in
Canada (in Percentages)
Ratio of Government Expenditures on
Current Goods and Services and Capital
Alternative Rates of Long-Run Formation to GNP in 1961 Dollars*
Average Annual Productivity in











aNote that transfer payments and subsidies have been omitted.







































Whether long-term changes in the government's share of total national
output are better measured by current-dollar (G/GNP) or by constant-
dollar (G'/GNP') ratios remains an open question. For the other kinds
of government expenditure, which are mainly transfer and net interest
payments (table 9.2), the problem is less one of measurement than one
of choice. The real value of these expenditures is determined not by
productivity in the public sector but rather by productivity in private
markets. They should, in other words, be converted to constant-dollar
terms by the use of private, not public, sector price indexes (Dubin
1977). It is what those payments will buy in private markets that deter-
mines their real value, and they should be treated accordingly.
This means, for one thing, that there is no simple way to convert total
government expenditures into constant-dollar terms. In principle, trans-
fer and interest payments should be deflated by price indexes specific to
the different groups receiving them. In practice, such measurement re-
finements may or may not be worth the costs of making them. To gain
some insights into the nature of these tradeoffs three alternative con-
stant-dollar/expenditure-to-GNP ratio series have been constructed and
are given in table 9.7, along with the usual current-dollar series. In the
first, presented as a standard of reference, all government expenditures,
regardless of type, are deflated by the appropriate NIPA implicit price
deflators for government output. In the second constant-dollar series,
real government purchases of goods and services are taken directly from
NIPA sources—i.e., are measured in the same way as in the first series
—but all other expenditures are deflated by the NIPA deflator for per-
sonal consumption expenditures (PCE). The third series is constructed
in the same way as the second except that the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) is used in place of the PCE deflator.
Two questions are of particular interest concerning the alternative
series shown in table 9.7. What differences, if any, are there in the mea-
sured growth rates for the whole postwar period? When do the postwar
peaks in the different E/GNP ratios occur? The answer to the first ques-
tion is shown at the bottom of the table where the 1978 values for each
series are given as a ratio to their corresponding 1947 values. Greater
rates of growth are shown by the current-dollar series than by any of
the others; and among the constant-dollar measures, much the least
growth is shown by the conventional series based on the implicit gov-628 George F. Break/ George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
ernment sector price deflators. Indeed, it shows federal expenditures to
have fallen slightly as a percentage of GNP between 1947 and 1978.
The growth trends shown by the two expenditure measures deflated in
part by alternative consumer price indexes are very similar. Finally, the
more rapid growth in state-local, relative to federal, expenditures shows
up clearly in all four series.
The years in which the relative size of government, measured by
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Source: Survey of Current Business, various issues.
Note: Direct government expenditures are those made to provide benefits directly
to the private sector. Intergovernmental grant expenditures are accordingly omitted
from the series.
aF=federal; SL=state-local; FSL=federal, state, and local.629 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
sistent both among the different table 9.7 series and with the output
share measures shown in table 9.4. The peak year for the federal gov-
ernment was 1953 in all cases, and for the state-local sector it was 1975.
For both governmental levels combined there was more variation, but
the same two years show up in all but one of the measures used.
Full Employment Adjustments
Isolating short-term changes in government expenditures and eco-
nomic activity and eliminating them from all affected measures in order
to reveal long-term trends more clearly has long been a major preoccu-
pation of empirical researchers. A good example for the postwar period
is provided by Charles Schultze's analysis of federal government spend-
ing trends and priorities (1976, pp. 323-69). In his measures, which
cover the 1955-77 period, both federal expenditures and GNP are ad-
justed for recession by computing their hypothetical levels at a constant
national rate of unemployment of 5 percent. In addition, any incremen-
tal costs of the Vietnam War are subtracted from federal expenditures.
These baseline budget expenditures are then divided by nonrecession
GNP estimates to provide an improved measure of federal governmental
growth. For the period studied Schultze's two adjusted series show a
significantly slower rise in the relative size of the federal sector than does
the standard unadjusted measure (table 9.8).
Which of these two pictures is the more realistic is debatable. The
unadjusted series may be unduly affected by temporary developments;
the adjusted series may fail to eliminate these aberrations properly. The
Schultze estimates, for example, are based on a constant unemployment
rate as the appropriate standard of adjustment,
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of Nonrecession GNP
Constant Dollars







Source: Schultze 1976, pp. 327-31.
*Estimated.630 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
the structure of United States labor markets may mean that a weighted
rate that varies with changes in the composition of the labor force would
be more appropriate (G. Perry 1970). The difficulties the Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA) has had recently in distinguishing temporary
from long-term changes in the economy's rate of productivity growth
indicate clearly the slipperiness of full employment or potential GNP
estimates.
7 It is interesting to note that when CEA estimates of full-
employment GNP are used to measure growth in the relative size of the
federal government, the picture is indeed different (table 9.9). The mea-
sures, by Pechman and Hartman (1979), show the full employment
federal E/GNP ratio rising from 17.6 percent in 1960 to 21.0 percent
in 1979, an increase slightly greater than 19 percent. Actual budget
outlays, in contrast, rose from 18.5 to 21.6 percent of actual GNP, a
growth of only 17 percent.
GNP Adjustments
A third difficulty with the measures of the size of government under
discussion is that there may be some systematic biases in the measure-
ment of GNP over the postwar period. Two sources of these problems,
tending to produce opposing biases in measured GNP during the period,
have been widely discussed.
The first is especially troublesome because its presence would indicate
that the two component terms of the E/GNP ratios are not independent,
as unbiased size-of-government estimates require, but rather are nega-
tively correlated. High government expenditures require high tax rates,
and higher tax rates may induce many activities and transactions that
would ordinarily be recorded in NIPA series to go underground and
hence to disappear from measured GNP. How large the underground
economy has become is a subject for vigorous current debate,
8 and by
its very nature it presents an elusive target for NIPA estimators, not to
mention Internal Revenue Service agents. At this point one can only
note the distinct possibility that nonrecorded transactions do increase
systematically in response to rising tax rates, and that these develop-
ments, if significant, impart an inherent upward bias to all E/GNP
measures of the size of government.
The other source of postwar bias in the GNP accounts has been cre-
ated by the steady movement of more and more married women into the
labor force (Boskin 1979). This represents a shift from nonmarket
production of household services or leisure, neither of which are part of
measured GNP, into market production, which is. Over the postwar
period, in other words, measured GNP has been rising faster than has
total economic activity. This upward bias in the E/GNP denominator
offsets, or dominates, the opposite bias created by the growth of the
underground economy. The net effect on measures of the relative size631 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
Table 9.9 Relation of Federal Budget Outlays to the
Gross National Product, in Current and



























































































































Sources: The Budget of the United States Government, Fis-
cal Year 1980, pp. 577-78. Full-employment figures are from
the Office of Management and Budget.
Note: From Pechman 1979, p. 26.
aEnding June 30 for 1960-76 and September 30 for 1977-79.
bFull-employment outlays as a percentage of full-employ-
ment GNP.
cCalculated in fiscal 1972 prices.
dEstimated.
of government may be guessed at and speculated about, but quantitative
determination seems out of reach, at least for the present.
Conclusion
There is, it seems, no single expenditure series that can be said to
predominate as the best measure of changes in the size of the public632 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
sector. Each candidate has its own strengths and weaknesses, and no one
of them can be relied upon alone. When questions arise as to whether
government is becoming more or less important, a procedure similar to
the NBER's identification of business cycle phases has much to recom-
mend it. A sustained two- or three-year rise in one particular E/OrNP
series may be no more indicative of government growth than a two-
quarter fall in real GNP is of the occurrence of a national recession.
Moreover, expenditures measure only one aspect of the government's
total impact on the economy. Tax expenditures, lending and loan guar-
antee operations, and regulatory activities must also be taken into ac-
count. Only when all, or most, of these complex dimensions of the
public sector's economic role show a definite expansion can one be sure
that government is really growing.
9.2 Trends in Intergovernmental Relations
Prominent among the widely recognized and discussed postwar fiscal
changes in this country has been a greatly increased public sector inter-
dependence. The fiscal measure of this trend is the rapid rise in federal
and state grants-in-aid. As table 9.10 shows, both types grew much
faster than did the economy as a whole; federal grants rose from .05
percent to 3.5 percent of GNP and state grants from 1 percent to 3.5
percent. As a result both state and local governments are now much
more dependent on outside funds than they were at the beginning of the
postwar period. Figure 9.2 shows the development of this important
structural change.
Table 9.10 Federal and State Intergovernmental
Grants as a Percentage of GNP,
Selected Years, 1946-78









Sources: NIP A data for federal grants and for state grants
since 1960. Survey of Current Business, vol. 56, part 2 (Jan-
uary 1976); May 1978, p. 16; and other issues. State grant
data prior to 1960 are from ACIR, The States and Intergov-
ernmental Aids, Report A-59 (February 1977), p. 9.
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Fig. 9.2 The growing state and local dependency on outside aid,
selected years 1948-78. (Outside aid as a percentage of
general revenue from own sources.) Data from ACIR, Sig-
nificant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1978-79 Edition,
Report M-115 (May 1979), p. 80.
Though no sharp reversal in these trends appears to be imminent,
there are signs that here too postwar growth rates may be slowing
markedly. Federal grants are projected in the 1981 United States budget
to grow less rapidly than the economy, falling to 3.5 percent of GNP
in 1979 and to 3.4 percent in 1981.
9 If these projections are realistic,
they represent a new phase in intergovernmental relations. With rela-
tively less federal money flowing in, states may slow the growth in their
own aid to local governments. It will be some time, however, before the
full significance of these developments is revealed.
In a federal fiscal system with significant flows of intergovernmental
aid two distinct measures of the relative importance of different levels of634 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
government can be constructed. Like transfer payments in the national
income accounts, intergovernmental grants may be treated in aggregate
fiscal accounting by either the deduct-add or the omission rule (Rolph
1948). Under the latter they are simply omitted from total expenditures
of all grantors. This yields for each level of government a measure of
spending made directly for the benefit of the private sector, or what the
Bureau of the Census calls direct expenditures. The focus here is on
the provision of final services to consumers or intermediate services to
business, regardless of whether the financial means came from the oper-
ating level of government or from outside sources. Under the deduct-add
rule, in contrast, intergovernmental expenditures are recorded in the
spending totals of grantors but then, in order to arrive at a nonduplicat-
ing total for all levels of government, intergovernmental revenues are
deducted from the recorded expenditures of grantees. The focus here is
on the expenditures made by each level of government that are financed
by that same level, or what may be called own-financed expenditures.
The changes that have occurred during the postwar period in both
measures of relative fiscal importance are shown in table 9.11. For this
purpose BOC measures of general expenditures are used because of
their availability for all three levels of government throughout the post-
war period. The first change of note, in direct general expenditure
(DGE) shares, is the decline in the importance of the federal govern-
ment as a provider of services to the private sector. Its share fell from
65 percent of total direct general expenditures in 1948 to one of 47
percent in 1976-77. These losses in relative importance were added
more or less equally to the state and local DGE shares. As a financing
agent, however, the federal government has remained supreme through-
Table 9.11 Federal, State, and Local Percentage Shares of Direct General






























































Sources: U.S. Bureau of Census, 1977 Census of Governments, vol. 6, Topical
Studies, no. 4, Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances and Employment,
tables 3, 5, and 6.635 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
out the postwar period. Its share of own-financed general expenditures
(OFGE) did vary from one year to another but never fell much below
60 percent. During the period, state governments steadily increased the
relative importance of their financing role from 15 percent of OFGE in
1948 to 22 percent in 1976-77, while local governments stayed close
to the 18 to 20 percent range.
Three-level estimates of government receipts and expenditures on a
NIPA basis have recently been made available for the 1959-76 period
(Levin 1978). Intergovernmental shares for direct and own-financed
expenditures, computed from these data, are shown in table 9.12. Some
of the same trends show up for both types, but the conceptual and mea-
surement differences between the two sources alter other trends. Federal
dominance of direct spending does decline during the period but less
rapidly than is shown in BOC data. In 1976 the federal share of direct
expenditures was 57 percent on a NIPA basis but only 46-47 percent
on a BOC basis. In both series the state share of direct expenditures
rises by one-third between 1960 and 1976, but the local share rises by
only one-eighth in NIPA data compared to a two-thirds increase in BOC
measures. In the own-financed expenditure series the federal government
leads the other two sectors by comparably wide margins, but the trends
are different. In NIPA measures the federal share is 68 percent in both
1960 and 1976 but declines from the 66 to 71 percent range at the
beginning of the period to 60 percent at the end in the BOC measures.
The local share stays close to 18-20 percent throughout the period in
BOC data (except for 1960), but falls from 17 to 14 percent in NIPA
data. In both sets of measures the state share of own-financed expendi-
tures rises during the postwar period.
9.3 Public Sector Functions
Three major changes in the functional structure of government ex-
penditures have occurred during the postwar period: (1) domestic pro-
Table 9.12 Federal, State, and Local Percentage Shares of NIPA Direct













































Source: Levin 1978, pp. 16-17.636 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
grams have gained significantly in relation to defense programs; (2)
social security and welfare spending has risen rapidly; and (3) social
investment expenditures in health, education, and other areas have also
increased in relative importance, but less dramatically.
There are a number of sources that could be used to document these
trends. The basic statistical data used here are those given in the NIPA
tables on "Government Expenditures by Type and Function" (table
3.14 in recent years). They were chosen because they provide a valuable
cross-classification by government ends and means—dividing expendi-
tures into twenty major functional classes and forty-three subclasses,
all carried out by the four major economic methods shown earlier in
table 9.2.
1
0 Discussion of these basic data is again supplemented by
reference to the fiscal analyses made in the Brookings Institution's
Setting National Priorities series.
Various measures of the postwar shift from defense to domestic spend-
ing, differing in their allocation of particular spending programs to the
two broad categories, are readily available. Table 9.13 shows the Pech-
man-Hartman breakdown, which simply separates national defense bud-
get outlays from all others. In their measures defense spending declines
from 49 percent of total federal outlays in fiscal 1960 to 23 percent in
1978 and 1979. Schultze combines federal budget outlays for national
defense and foreign affairs in his baseline series and classifies all others
as domestic. In this treatment domestic programs rise from 7 to nearly
15 percent of nonrecession GNP between 1955 and 1977, while national
security programs fall from 11 percent to 5 percent (table 9.14). A still
broader definition of defense spending is used by the Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). It includes national de-
fense, international affairs and finance, space research and technology,
and an allocated portion of net federal interest payments. In their tabu-
lations federal domestic own-financed expenditures begin the postwar
period in the 6 to 8 percent of GNP range (between 1949 and 1959)
and rise to a 15-16 percentage plateau in the late 1970s (table 9.15).
During the past quarter decade, then, government domestic programs
have gained significantly with the structural shift away from defense
spending, In the nature of the case, that shift could not continue indefi-
nitely, and indeed President Carter's 1981 budget indicates that it may
soon be stopped, or even reversed. Within the domestic sector itself, the
largest growth in relative importance has occurred in education programs
(mainly at the state and local level), and in social security and welfare
services (mainly at the federal level). Table 9.16 provides the details.
The NIPA tabulations used begin with 1952, but since that year was
significantly influenced by the Korean War, 1955 is also given in table
9.16 as an alternative initial year for the identification of postwar637 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
changes in functional shares. Whichever early year is taken, the large
relative decline in national defense expenditures stands out. The other
major fall in relative importance occurred in transportation programs,
but in the state and local sector only. Education expenditures rose from
12 percent of total direct government expenditures in 1955 to 18 per-
cent in 1978, from 36 to 38 percent of state-local direct expenditures,






































































































































































Sources: Office of Management and Budget, "Federal Government Finances" (Jan-
uary 1979), pp. 40-42, 65-67.
Note: From Pechman and Hartman 1979, p. 28.
aEnding June 30 for 1960-76 and September 30 for 1977-79.
bPayments for retirement, disability, and unemployment (principally social security,
medicare, veterans' pensions and compensation, and unemployment insurance) and
low-income assistance (principally welfare, food stamps, housing, and medicaid).
Includes grants-in-aid to state and local governments that subsequently result in
payments for individuals.
cTotal grants-in-aid, including grants for payments for individuals.
dEstimated.638 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
Table 9.14 Federal Baseline Budget Outlays for
Defense and Domestic Programs, as
a Percentage of Nonrecession GNP,
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Source: Schultze 1976, p. 328.
*Estimated.
period. By far the largest rise, however, was in social security and wel-
fare services. From a 7-11 percent share in 1952-55 for all levels of
government combined they vaulted to a 25 percent share in 1978.
A more detailed analysis of federal domestic programs alone is pro-
vided by Schultze's baseline budget tabulations, shown in table 9.17.
The rapid growth in payments to individuals, both for retirement, dis-
ability and unemployment, and for low-income assistance, stands out.
It is also interesting to note that while expenditures for Schultze's cate-
gories of physical and social investment were both 2.1 percent of non-
recession GNP in 1977, those for physical investment were 1.6 percent
of GNP in 1955, while those for social investment were only 0.6 percent.
9.4 Government Revenue Systems
That the governmental revenue structure has changed significantly
during the postwar period is not likely to be disputed. Some of the
specific dimensions of that change, however, vary with the view one
wishes to take of government finance. In the revenue game there are
many individual players. While the contribution each has made to the
total revenue raised during the postwar period is a matter of record,
the significance of each contribution depends on the context in which
it is evaluated, and in particular on the performance of its most directly
competing contributors.
Three alternative sets of revenue data are presented here for two or
three levels of government, depending on the availability of data. The639 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
first, given in table 9.18, compares the percentage distributions in 1948
and 1976-77 of BOC:GF total own-source government revenue. For
all levels of government combined by far the largest relative increase
during the period occurred in insurance trust revenues, from 7 percent
of the total in 1948 to 20 percent in 1976-77. General sales taxes were
next with a doubling of their percentage share, but it was still only 5.5
percent at the end of the period. The property tax, in contrast, main-
Table 9.15 Federal Government Expenditures from
Own Funds on Defense and Domestic









































































































































Source: ACIR, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism,
1978-79 Edition, Report M-115 (May 1979), p. 7.
Note: P = preliminary; est. = estimated.640 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson














































































































































































Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, The Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-65; Statistical
Tables (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), table 3.10; and Survey
of Current Business, vol. 59 (July 1979), table 3.14.
tained a stable share of total revenue while the individual income tax
declined slightly. More significant losses in production of revenue were
registered by the corporation income tax and excises. If state liquor store
profits are combined with them, excise revenues fell from 16 percent of
the total in 1948 to less than 7 percent in 1976-77.
When attention is focused on each of the three levels of government,
several new dimensions of the total revenue picture appear. The prop-
erty tax remained the most important source of local government reve-













































































































































































more than tripled its relative importance at the state level, from 5 to 16
percent, and for local governments it rose from insignificance in 1948
to provide 3 percent of total revenues in 1976-77. Excise tax receipts
fell most dramatically at the federal level and significantly at the state
level, but rose in relative importance for local governments. Finally, the
heterogeneous category "charges and miscellaneous" raised its standing
moderately at the state level and significantly among local governments.
If user charges make up a large portion of that last category at the local
level,
1
1 the ten percentage point increase in it, accompanied by an equal
percentage point decline in the local revenue share of the property tax,
provides an intriguing, though no doubt wholly coincidental, adumbra-
tion of the two revenue trends most likely to result from California's
Proposition 13 and similar local tax limitation measures.! r-
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Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 7977 Census of Government, vol. 6, Topical
Studies no. 4, Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances and Employment,
tables 1, 3, 5, and 6.
aMinor amount included in individual income tax.
bMinor amount included in "All other" taxes.
Among the revenue sources used by governments taxes clearly attract
the most public interest. Postwar changes in the structure of United
States tax systems are therefore of special interest. Before these can be
elucidated, however, a decision must be made about how to treat the
payroll tax for social security. Is it simply a tax, or is it so closely related
to benefits-to-be-received that it should be treated as a public price or
user charge? The answer, of course, is that it is a rather ambiguous
mixture of both of those features (see, for example, Break 1977). Since
it cannot readily be classified as the one or the other, the United States
tax structure will be shown both ways, with social insurance revenues
treated as taxes (total tax revenue in table 9.19) and with those receipts
excluded from the tax category (general tax revenue in table 9.19).
International tax comparisons must deal with the same troublesome
issues (see, for example, D. Perry 1979).644 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
Table 9.19 Structure of the United States Tax System: Percentage
































































































































Source: Survey of Current Business, January 1976 and July 1979, tables 3.2 and 3.4.
Notes: All receipts listed in "nontaxes" categories are excluded. Receipts from
Federal Reserve banks are excluded from corporation profits tax accruals. Cus-
toms duties are included under Sales and Excise taxes and motor vehicle license
receipts are included under the Other category.
The main distinction between the two interpretations of tax totals
collected by all levels of government during the postwar period lies in
the roles played by social insurance contributions and the individual
income tax. In the "total tax" structure, social insurance revenue is the
big gainer, from 10 percent of total taxes in 1948-50 to 25 percent in
1978, while the individual income tax provided close to a third of total
tax revenues at both the beginning and the end of the period. As a
source of "general tax" revenue, on the other hand, the individual in-
come tax made a significant gain in its relative position, from 36 percent
of the total in 1948 to 46 percent in 1978. In both tabulations the prop-
erty tax has been falling in relative importance in recent years, and the
corporation income tax again shows a significant postwar decline. The
sales and excise category combines opposing movements on the part of
general sales taxes, which grew considerably, and excises, which lost
ground during the period.
1
2
While the federal general fund has become almost a single tax system
during the postwar period, both state and local governments have sig-645 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
nificantly diversified their general tax structures. The federal individual
income tax provided just over half of all federal government general tax
receipts in 1948; in 1978 it provided 66 percent (table 9.20). When
the corporate profits tax is added to the picture, the federal govern-
ment's reliance on income taxation is seen to have increased during the
period from 76 percent to 87 percent of total general revenues. Excises
provide the only other major source of federal tax receipts, and their
share of the total declined from 20 percent in 1948 to 10 percent in
1978.
State governments began the postwar period with heavy reliance on
selective sales and general sales taxes (table 9.21). The principal changes
during the period were the rapid increase in the importance of individual
income taxes (from 7 percent of the total in 1948 to 26 percent in
1978), and the less meteoric rise in the general sales tax (from 22 to 30
percent of the total). Selective sales taxes showed the greatest decline.
In the local government sector individual income and general sales
taxes have also increased in relative importance in the last thirty years,
but their role is still a minor one compared to the property tax (table
9.22). That venerable levy, which produced 89 percent of total local tax
collections in 1948 (as it had in 1902), was still producing 86 percent
in 1968, but by 1978 it had declined to an 80 percent share. This may
seem a relatively modest rate of decline, but it is, of course, an average
for a highly diverse set of individual local government units throughout
the country. If city revenue systems are studied by themselves, a very
different picture emerges (tables 9.23 and 9.24). Whether one takes
only the largest cities or all those with populations above 25,000 in
Table 9.20 General Tax Revenue of the Federal
Government, by Major Type, Percentage
Distributions for Selected Years, 1948-78
























































Source: ACIR, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism,
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Local Tax Collections, by Major Source, Selected Years 1902-78































































































































































































Source: ACIR, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1978-79 Edition, Report
M-115 (May 1979), p. 55.
aIncludes minor amounts of local corporation income taxes.
bThe distribution of sales and gross receipts taxes between "General" and "Selec-
tive" for the years 1936-48 are estimated.
cPartially estimated.649 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
1940 and 50,000 in 1970, the postwar decline in relative importance
of the property tax is precipitous. As a source of general revenue, the
contribution of the property tax declined from 55 percent in 1947 to
23-26 percent in 1976-77, while within the tax category alone its share
fell from 81 to 60 percent for all cities and from 77 to 53 percent for
large cities. As noted earlier, city fiscal systems have become more and
more dependent on outside aid (20 percent of the total in 1947 and 44
percent in 1976-77), with much more of it coming directly from the
federal government.
9.5 Tax Expenditures
No account of postwar changes in government expenditures and reve-
nues would be complete without some discussion of that hybrid category
known as federal tax expenditures. Their official definition is "revenue
losses attributable to provisions of the federal tax laws which allow a
special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax
liability."
1
3 In principle, these are all departures from the "normal"
Table 9.23 City Revenues, by Major Source, 1947




general sales and gross receipts




























Sources: 1947 data: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census Compendium of City Government Finances
in 1947, 1949 table 2, p. 6. 1976-77 data: U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. City Government Fi-
nances in 1976-77, 1979 table 1, p. 5.
a1947 data are for 397 cities with 1940 populations greater
than 25,000.
b 1976-77 data are for the 392 cities with 1970 populations
greater than 50,000 and a sampling of cities with 1970 pop-
ulation less than 50,000.
cCategory not listed separately in original source. Amounts
included in "other" taxes.650 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
Table 9.24 Large City Revenues, by Major Source,





general sales and gross receipts































Sources: 1947 data: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census, Large-City Finances in 1947 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), table 1, p. 5.
1976-77 data: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, City Government Finances in 1976-77 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), table 8,
p. 97.
a1947 data are for 37 cities with 1940 populations greater
than 250,000.
b 1976-77 data are for 46 cities with 1970 populations greater
than 300,000.
cCategory not listed separately in original source. Amounts
included in "other" taxes.
structure of individual and corporation income taxes chosen expressly
to pursue various public policy objectives. Seen in this light, tax expen-
ditures are "alternatives to budget outlays, credit assistance, or other
policy instruments,"
1
4 and as such should be included in any analysis
of federal government expenditure policies or trends. That they merit
close attention is indicated by their rapid postwar growth, shown in
table 9.25 and figure 9.3.
In dealing with tax expenditures, however, one encounters serious
conceptual and measurement difficulties. There is, in the first place, no
general consensus as to what the "normal" structure of an income tax
is. Of the top ten federal tax expenditures in fiscal 1980, shown in table
9.26, three are debatable candidates for the list. Andrews (1972) has
questioned this interpretation of the medical and charitable contribution
deductions and Break (in press) has argued that the deductibility of
state and local nonbusiness ability-to-pay taxes may be an integral part
of a federal structure. Conceptual problems also exist for the most im-
portant item on the list—long-term capital gains. Would a shift to theVO <N "fr ft © ©
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"normal" income tax structure simply involve elimination of the present
60 percent exclusion of long-term capital gains, or would it also include
full deductibility of capital losses from ordinary income, indexation of















1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
Fig. 9.3 Trends in tax expenditures and other measures of federal
finances, 1970-80. Data from table 9.25.653 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
Table 9.26 The Top Ten Federal Tax Expenditure Categories, Fiscal Year






1. Capital gains 23.3
2. Investment tax credit 19.1
3. State and local nonbusiness taxes 17.7
4. Exclusion of pension contributions and earnings 15.1
5. Medical expense exclusions and deductions 12.7
6. Interest on home mortgages and consumer credit 12.2
7. Charitable contributions 9.0
8. Exclusion of social security and railroad
retirement benefits 8.4
9. Interest on state and local debt 7.7
10. Excess of percentage over cost depletion; expensing
of exploration and development costs 3.4
Source: Special Analyses (1979, pp. 207-11).
aConstructed in some cases from separate items in the official tax expenditure list;
addition of separate revenue loss estimates subject to the qualifications discussed in
the text.
basis for the current realization basis of the tax? The answers given to
these questions, which are likely to differ from one expert to another,
would make a great deal of difference in the reported size of the capital
gains tax expenditure, as indicated by a recent study of corporate capital
gains and losses by Feldstein and Slemrod (1978). According to their
calculations for 1973 the taxation of real corporate capital gains at ordi-
nary tax rates with full deductibility for real capital losses would have
raised only slightly more revenue, assuming no investor reactions to tax
change, than did the existing tax law.
1
5 According to this definition of
the "normal" tax structure, then, virtually no capital gains tax expendi-
ture was made in 1973.
1
6
Even if all the individual tax expenditure items were, by some ideal
standard, correctly defined and measured, further difficulties would be
encountered in adding them together to obtain separate totals for par-
ticular functional areas or a grand total for the whole set, since the
presence of important interactions among them would make the revenue
loss from any one of them a function of the tax treatment of various
others. The revenue to be gained from eliminating two tax expenditure
items, then, may be either larger or smaller than the sum of their indi-
vidual estimated costs.
1
7 Official tabulations of tax expenditures, in fact,
deliberately omit functional and grand totals. To expect people not to
add together the individual items, however, is like expecting no one to
climb Mount Everest. They will be added because they are there. What
insights may be obtained from such exercises, however, are highly prob-654 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
lematical. For the moment it seems best to note the presence and devel-
opment of federal tax expenditures but not to add them formally to any
of the expenditure series discussed earlier.
9.6 Summary
This paper has scrutinized alternative measures of government expen-
ditures and revenues, assessed their usefulness as indicators of postwar
fiscal trends, and identified what appear to be the major structural
changes that have occurred in this area during the past thirty years.
Among these changes are the following:
1. The government sector is larger than it was at the beginning of
the period, but in many of its dimensions it has been growing
recently less rapidly than the economy as a whole.
2. The federal government's tax-transfer programs have grown rap-
idly, especially in the domestic program sector.
3. Defense spending has declined significantly, but that trend may
be stopped, or reversed, soon.
4. Social insurance expenditures and the payroll taxes that finance
them have been major growth components of the public sector.
5. The public sector's share of national output has not grown sig-
nificantly since 1953, but state and local governments have re-
placed the federal government as the major partner in these
activities.
6. Intergovernmental grants have grown rapidly, and the public sec-
tor has consequently become significantly more interdependent.
7. The state-local sector has become more centralized, especially in
the financing of its major programs.
8. Federal grants made directly to local governments have become
an important part of the intergovernmental picture and have con-
verted traditional hierarchical relations into triangular ones.
9. The federal tax structure has become more homogeneous during
the postwar period. Insurance trust programs are mainly financed
by payroll taxes and the general fund relies heavily on individual
and corporation income taxes.
10. State-local tax systems, in contrast, have become more diversified
and more responsive to economic growth and inflation.
11. The property tax remains the dominant contributor to own-source
local government revenues, but its position is considerably less
secure than it was at the beginning of the period, and there are
now wide variations in its relative use among different kinds and
sizes of local governments.
12. Federal tax expenditures appear to have grown rapidly, but the
significance of these developments cannot readily be discerned.655 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
13. Strong inflationary pressures in recent years have not only com-
plicated the measurement of fiscal trends, but they may also be
causing important structural changes that are only beginning to
appear on the scene. Extrapolation of past trends is always a
dangerous game; it appears to be especially so at this time.
Notes
1. Table 3.18 in the NIP A accounts, published each year in the July issue of
the Survey of Current Business, shows the relation between NIP A and BOC:GF
measures of state and local government receipts and expenditures.
2. Even that measure can be questioned for its choice of the two terminal years
used. In principle, one would like two years when the economy was at peacetime
levels of full, or comparably high, employment. In practice, one must use single
years that fall short of those requirements, averages of several years that may
obscure important changes, or single years adjusted to estimate what peacetime
full employment values would have been. The terminal years used in table 9.1,
while not ideal, seem good enough to show the broad trends sought at this point.
3. See, for example, the discussion of the treatment of federal government spon-
sored enterprises and of the offsetting of receipts against expenditures for particu-
lar programs in the federal budget in the President's Commission on Budget
Concepts (1967), pp. 187-95 and 245-76, respectively.
4. This was the term used in the first edition of A Study in Public Finance. In
the second Pigou changed it to "real" expenditures and in the third to "non-trans-
fer" expenditures. Of the three the most memorable and distinctive is surely the
first (Pigou 1947, p. 19).
5. In the 1976 revisions the measurement of real factor inputs in the govern-
ment sector was changed so as to distinguish, within the limits of data availability,
between wage bill increases created by the hiring of better qualified workers or
the promotion of employees on the basis of merit, which are interpreted as in-
creases in the quality of government inputs, and wage bill increases resulting from
general upward adjustments in the whole pay structure, which are not. Estimates
of constant-dollar purchases from business were also improved by the use of new
information on prices and the composition of the inputs. Survey of Current Busi-
ness, Part I, January 1976, p. 22.
6. Schultze used a 5 percent rate as a matter of convenience but noted the use
of a 4 or a 6 percent rate would have made little difference (1976, pp. 327-28).
7. Economic Report of the President 1979, pp. 72-76.
8. Business Week 1978, pp. 73-77; 1979, p. 26; the Internal Revenue's first
attempt to study tax noncompliance comprehensively, Estimates of Income Unre-
ported on Individual Income Tax Returns, was released in September 1979.
9. Special analyses (1980, pp. 8, 254).
10. Transfer and interest payments are combined in NIP A table 3.14.
11. Census publications do not provide the needed detail, but NIPA data for
the state and local sector show that in 1977, for example, education, health, and
hospital charges were 75 percent of the "nontax" category of total receipts.
12. State retail sales taxes were 2.8 percent of total tax revenues in 1948 and
5.8 percent in 1978. The corresponding shares of general tax revenues were 3 per-:656 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
cent in 1948 and 7.7 percent in 1978. In addition, local general sales taxes in-
creased from 3 percent of general tax revenues in 1948 to 8 percent in 1978 (table
9.22).
13. Special analyses (1979, p. 183).
14. Ibid. The basic conception and its importance for policy analysis was devel-
oped by Stanley S. Surrey as assistant treasury secretary in the Johnson adminis-
tration in 1967 and later (Surrey 1973; see also Feldstein 1975).
15. The amounts were $1,138 million from the 1973 tax law and $1,193 from
the revised structure indicated (Feldstein and Slemrod 1978, p. 114).
16. All tax expenditure estimates are impact measures. That is, they take no
account of the potential effects on tax revenues of taxpayer reactions to elimina-
tion of the particular tax expenditure item under study. In the situation under
discussion here, as studies by Feldstein and his associates strongly suggest, any
tightening of the capital gains tax rules, while retaining a realization basis, would
significantly reduce capital asset sales with correspondingly important effects on
federal income tax revenues (Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki 1978; Feldstein and
Yitzhaki 1978).
17. See for example, Special analyses (1979, pp. 189-93).
2. George P. Shultz
The Comparative Advantage of Government
No one can question that government's role in the postwar economy has
grown tremendously, changed qualitatively, and has affected markedly
virtually every aspect of economic activity. We all know that govern-
ment is legitimate and necessary and that government is here to stay.
But, along with other leading institutions in our society, its performance
is now widely criticized and reactions to its size, power, and pervasive-
ness are increasingly sharp.
The postwar surge of its spending, taxing, regulating, and judging has
produced some important accomplishments, but also much to worry us.
Not least of these worries is the uneasy and widespread feeling that the
juggernaut may be out of control—powered by a dynamic of its own,
unrelated to our broad concerns almost because of its close relation to
our parochial concerns, with results that are as disagreeable for our
allies and friends around the world as they are for us. Certain issues
stand out; that illustrate problems brought about by the role that govern-
ment has played in changing the postwar American economy. I will
discuss five such issues in this commentary.
Issue: Comparative advantage (and disadvantage) in the tasks that
government undertakes: the need for limits.
George P. Shultz is vice-chairman of the Bechtel group of companies and pro-
fessor at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.657 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
Even governments need to recognize that a given form of organization
or aggregation of people cannot do everything. Competence is impor-
tant and it demands specialization. But as the reach of government has
extended more and more into our economic and private lives, govern-
ment officials have been led more and more into areas where they have
no comparative advantage and may even be out of their element entirely.
Government increasingly has come to dominate the production of essen-
tial goods and services and their allocation to various uses, substituting
a system of bureaucratic command and control for the incentives of
private enterprise and the pulls and hauls of the marketplace.
Private enterprises operating in a competitive market have a clear
comparative advantage whenever the objective is efficiency in the use of
resources, adaptation to variations in local and individual needs, or re-
sponsiveness to meet new issues and changed conditions. The superiority
of the private market over governmental command and control of large
sectors of the economy derives in part from its superiority in the essen-
tial tasks of collecting and evaluating information, of giving opportunity
for the expression of individual tastes, and of driving producers to seek
the lowest cost methods for transforming raw materials into goods that
people want and value.
In addition, important managerial distinctions may be drawn between
government and private business that bear on their respective areas of
comparative advantage. These distinctions start with the deliberately flat
organization structure of the federal government, stemming from the
very concept of checks and balances. The resulting disposition to delay
has been compounded in recent years by the wide distribution of action-
stopping power among Congress, the executive branch, the judiciary,
and the regulatory agencies. Government action is crablike at best, with
an overwhelming emphasis on criticism and on policy formulation as
opposed to execution of concrete tasks.
By contrast, the pyramidal structure of organization described in most
textbooks does reasonably resemble the reality of business. A "doing"
organization must be set up to force the decisiveness that gets action.
One of the first lessons I learned in moving from government to business
is that in business you must be very careful when you tell people who
are working for you to do something, because the probability is high
that they will do it. In government, no way! For, among other things,
they don't necessarily consider themselves to be really working for you
in the first place.
This contrast between "debating" and "criticizing" organizations with
their disposition to delay, and "doing" organizations with their spirit of
action underlies the comparative disadvantage of government in manag-
ing important parts of the economy. And many of our economic prob-
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decisions being made through the political process rather than the mar-
ket process.
The problem is nowhere better or more tragically illustrated than in
the field of energy. Decisions as to price, allocation of supplies, and
siting of plants are based heavily on political rather than market consid-
erations. Now the proposed bill, S.I246, if passed, would further extend
the government's political intrusion into the allocation of capital within
the energy industry. The inevitable result is that a potentially efficient
system for producing and consuming energy becomes ensnarled by high-
visibility politics, dominated by regional considerations, varying cor-
porate interests and their different abilities to exert political influence,
and, importantly, attempts to use the energy system as a means for
distributing welfare benefits. By this time, everyone knows the result is
a mess.
Perhaps the situation is serious enough and the mess is obvious
enough to allow the operation of Katz's law: "When things get bad
enough, people will do even obvious and sensible things." If so, govern-
ment should back off from its areas of comparative disadvantage and
spend its time and the taxpayer's money in areas where it has special
capabilities and responsibilities. In a field such as energy, these areas
include seeing that externalities (e.g., the costs of dealing with pollut-
ants) are reflected in the marketplace and insuring that the markets
themselves are competitive.
More generally, government has a clear comparative advantage in the
raising and distributing of money. In the postwar period government
has in fact become, in considerable measure, an income redistribution
system. But to perform this function, government need not, as it has, get
into the business of providing health, housing, and a host of other in-
kind services, where it operates at a comparative disadvantage. The
feeling is widespread today that administration of these efforts is waste-
ful, unfair, and unwise—a feeling borne out by detailed analysis of the
income maintenance system.
But government's special responsibility must primarily be the provi-
sion of a framework of law and security for people pursuing their own
objectives, and the development of a military capacity able to defend
the country's vital interests. We all rely on government to perform well
in these areas of comparative advantage and unique responsibility.
Issue: Regulations and, even more, the uncertainties created by the pro-
cesses of implementing them—a real wild card—inhibit thinking
and actions geared to long-term objectives and requiring long-
term capital commitments.
Regulations and the regulatory process are receiving increasing atten-
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which government regulations are addressed are heavily publicized.
Sometimes publicity is based on faulty analysis or on dramatization of
"horror" stories, both of which invite political overreaction. Neverthe-
less, many real problems do exist. Government must particularly con-
cern itself with areas where externalities are involved, such as the cases
of air and water pollution, although a pricing approach (e.g., an effluent
tax) rather than a command and control approach is frequently prefer-
able on grounds of fairness and efficiency. At the same time, one experi-
ment in deregulation, with airlines, is moderately successful and others
should be tried, though they may not be. Certainly the time is long past
when regulation of the railroads can be justified on the grounds that
railroads possess a monopoly in the field of transportation, and there
never was any economic justification for the regulation of trucking.
Wide-ranging efforts are being made to estimate the costs of comply-
ing with regulation, with contributions coming from the academic, busi-
ness, and governmental communities. Approximations like "$100 billion
per year and growing," conservative in that they take into account only
a part of the problem, increasingly force attention to the questions:
What are the benefits? And are they really worth it?
Important though it is to question the need for certain regulations
and to estimate their costs as well as their benefits, it is even more essen-
tial to think through the long-term consequences of the extreme uncer-
tainties inherent in the processes through which regulation is imple-
mented. An individual project can be subject to a myriad of regulations
administered by various levels and agencies of government with different
jurisdictions and objectives. It often seems impossible to get a definitive
decision, especially given the number of intervenors who have standing
to interpose legal challenges at almost any stage of a project. It is worth
noting that the Alaska Pipeline could only be built after Congress passed
a law overriding all previous laws that were blocking its construction.
And the proposed Energy Mobilization Board, still another level of
bureaucracy, is based on the assumption that a supra-agency is necessary
to cut through the maze of red tape if significant energy projects are to
get under way.
A well-publicized example of difficulties posed by the regulatory maze
involved Sohio's efforts to move oil from the West Coast inland by pipe-
line. In January 1975 the company began the process of securing neces-
sary permits and government approvals: a total of approximately 700
permits were required from about 140 local, state, federal, or private
agencies. On 13 March 1979, fifty months later, the decision was reached
to abandon the project. In the interim, Sohio had spent $50 million and
managed to secure only 250 of the 700 permits required. When the oil
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per month in the approval procedures. Governments regulated this proj-
ect right out of existence.
The volume of permits Sohio had to obtain and of government bodies
before whom it had to appear suggest another aspect of the problem.
Adam Smith once remarked that specialization increases with the size
of the market. Perversely, the vast increase in regulation in recent years
has been accompanied by a form of specialization that amounts to a
"balkanization" of problems. A whole host of federal, state, and local
agencies regulate various aspects of what to a business is one problem.
The legitimate concern is not just a matter of the time involved to go
to so many different places for answers. Action can be completely hung
up by differences of view among those who represent regulatory interests
that are deliberately insulated from each other by statute. A friend of
mine once remarked that "whatever is not prohibited nowadays is re-
quired." I am forced to amend his statement to "whatever is prohibited
may also be required."
These regulatory uncertainties continue into the operations phase of
any major undertaking, and they are having a devastating impact on
major long-term undertakings. The proposition involved here is fairly
obvious: The greater the uncertainty connected with future benefits from
an investment, the more these benefits are discounted. The result surely
is to skew the investment process into short-term undertakings and to
discourage just those kinds of long-term efforts needed to make effective
progress on such problems as energy.
It is sometimes remarked that only the government can handle major
undertakings with long-term consequences. That may well describe the
world we now live in, but that unappealing situation is created not by
the market, not by the inability of private enterprises to organize huge
undertakings or by their unwillingness to assume risk. Rather it reflects
the facts that government has injected unnecessary uncertainties and
risks, including the risks of price and profit controls in the future, and
that only government can use compulsion to raise capital for an un-
profitable venture or one for which the wild card of regulatory uncer-
tainty looms too large. The impending result: more government activity
in areas of its comparative disadvantage. A far better course is to reduce
regulatory uncertainty so that private capital can seek out the most
promising ventures for the long term.
Issue: High marginal rates of taxation at all income levels bring major
distortions in economic activity and increasing resistance at the
voting booth and in individual economic behavior.
This problem is all too familiar for middle and high income earners.
The distortions of economic activity involved in the avid search for tax
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est marginal rates testify to their basic futility. The relentless way in
which inflation projects middle income earners into ever-higher tax rate
brackets has received increasing commentary, so that now the idea of
"indexing" the tax system can almost be taken out of quotation marks.
Unfortunately, even such a simple and basic change as indexing has not
been made. Nevertheless, attention to and recognition of these undesir-
able consequences suggests that some action may well be in the offing.
Less attention has been paid to the high marginal rates of taxation
on the poor and to the fact that they, too, react predictably and nega-
tively. Of course, they can't afford tax lawyers, but they have found
effective ways to shelter income. Reliance on government transfer pay-
ments instead of employment is one available tax shelter for the poor.
Work in the underground economy, where people are paid in kind or
cash, not reported for tax or GNP purposes, is another.
Unfortunately, neither the NBER nor anyone else has produced con-
vincing evidence regarding the size and rate of growth of the under-
ground economy. The more enthusiastic estimates range from 10 to 27
percent of the GNP ($200 to $500 billion) with recent growth at rates
of from 20 to 40 percent per year. Though I doubt that the high end of
these estimates can be taken seriously, this subject deserves much more
attention. Intuitively, it is highly plausible that the poor will react to the
high direct rates of taxation on earnings (in the form of withdrawal of
benefits) and the high indirect taxes on spending by concealing earnings
and acquiring goods and services so far as possible in ways that escape
much or all indirect tax. Anecdotally, I have seen some astounding ex-
amples on a personal level—and not just confined to those in lower
income brackets. The other day I noticed a judge insist on payment in
cash for performing services at a wedding.
The implications of this government-induced change in the postwar
economy are important, if the phenomenon itself is important. A grow-
ing underground economy means that, even at the low end of the range
mentioned above, the rate of increase in real GNP is being underesti-
mated by one percentage point and levels of unemployment are being
significantly overestimated. Such mistakes give an obvious inflationary
bias to economic policy.
But I wonder if a different and more powerful point is in the making.
The electorate in eleven states has recently voted for greater control of
spending or of tax rates at the state and local level, where control can
be more direct than at the federal level; and thirty states have endorsed
a constitutional amendment calling for a balanced federal budget. At the
level of individual economic behavior another manifestation of this po-
litical reaction may well be the underground economy. If it is anywhere
near as sizable as some estimates suggest, the implied tax revolt is very
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compelling, decisions about the composition of government activity be-
come as difficult as they are crucial. Increasingly, the answer to "which?"
may no longer be "both," even in capitol cities.
Issue: How do we provide for an adequate defense when an already
high rate of taxation and expenditure reflects government's major
role as the redistributor of income?
The numerical facts involved are well brought out in Professor Break's
paper: Total government expenditures have risen from 21 to 36 percent
of the GNP during the period 1948 through 1977. These estimates do
not take account of off-budget finance or spending required of the pri-
vate sector by government, both growth areas. Meanwhile, drawing from
Professor Break's paper, "domestic programs rise from 7 to nearly 15
percent of nonrecession GNP between 1955 and 1977, while national
security programs fall from 11 percent to 5 percent"; "the federal gov-
ernment's tax-transfer programs have grown rapidly, especially in the
domestic program sector"; and "social insurance expenditures and the
payroll taxes that finance them have been major growth components of
the public sector."
As is well known, the chief characteristic of government transfer pro-
grams is their "entitlement" nature, with people entitled to a payment
based upon such characteristics as income, age, minority status, or place
of residence. Sometimes, in fact, they are paid as a result of their in-
genuity in beating the system. It is a misnomer to talk of a budget for
these programs since the best that can be done is simply to estimate
how heavy the drawings will be on the entitlements. With 46 percent of
the families in the United States receiving a transfer payment of some
kind, it is easy to see that this large and growing sector of the budget
has considerable momentum behind it. I speak with some feeling as a
former OMB director who, with scars and without success, tried to cur-
tail school lunch spending on behalf of children of middle and upper
income parents.
If there is anything to the idea that taxpayers are in a rebellious frame
of mind about paying for burgeoning government growth, then the mo-
mentum behind the redistributive functions of government can over-
whelm our ability to finance an adequate defense. This internally gener-
ated threat to our national security deserves sober thought and decisive
action. Some way must be found, at a minimum, to make the transfer
payment system more internally efficient, as one approach to curbing
its growth. In the end, though, the entitlements themselves must be sub-
ject to critical scrutiny.
Issue: The escalating rate of inflation is one postwar change in the
American economy in which government's role is central and
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Without belaboring the whole gamut of budget, tax, regulatory, and
other government actions that raise costs and the chronic monetary
accommodation of rising prices, I will simply assert here that inflation,
including our current roaring version, is rooted in government policy
and behavior. However broad the agreement with this observation, the
practical outcome seems to be—almost as though drawn toward it by a
magnet—some form of wage and price controls. As these controls move
into center stage, unwillingness to conform with them becomes con-
veniently tagged as the reason for inflation, and those unwilling to
conform as the villains. This process of shifting blame from culprit to
victim obscures the main point of government responsibility. Economic
miseducation is given an added boost when prominent managements
feel impelled to make public statements in support of such programs.
The activities of OPEC and the political vulnerability of large oil com-
panies offer apparently irresistible opportunities to shift political blame
further. Such scapegoating may be good politics, but it is certainly lousy
economics.
Inflation has been with us long enough now and has become enough
of a preoccupation that many question whether the problem can be dealt
with at all. The answer is a clear "yes." Our own prior experience in the
fifties and early sixties with relatively stable prices shows that it can be
done. And today the experience of other countries has given us evidence
that inflation is not an international disease. Even among tightly linked
countries like those of the Common Market, rates of inflation vary tre-
mendously (in 1978 the highest rate, in Italy, was over four times the
lowest, in West Germany).
We know what to do. Classical economic measures—disciplined fiscal
and monetary action and a tax and regulatory environment conducive
to capital formation and productivity—have worked for us in the past
and work for others at present. The problem is not what to do but how
to do it. The problem is to rearrange the political landscape so that the
necessary is also the doable.
The Bottom Line
Political attitudes may be changing, with the public lowering its ex-
pectations about the ability of government to solve problems, insisting
that legislators recognize limits to the tolerable level of taxation, give
more attention to the importance of investment and productivity, and
deal more effectively with high and rising rates of inflation. I hope.these
changes are for real, in part because such developments would help
government do better those things where it has a comparative advantage
and where, as citizens, we count on exemplary performance.
One prime objective involves the need in a stable and healthy society
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of markets and enterprise, driven as it is by competitive pressures, is the
way to an efficient society. Beyond efficiency, the market system metes
out a great measure of equity and it is a profound respecter of the im-
portance of individual choice. Nevertheless, fairness demands attention
to equality of opportunity and to access, at least on some minimum
level, to essential goods and services. We have seen many changes sweep
through our society, a much more heterogeneous one than most, and
yet it has held together. I believe a measure of the credit for this achieve-
ment must go to those elements of equity provided through the political
process. Transfer payments, with all their faults, are the principal ve-
hicle for the political expression of equity. That equity arguments are
all too often used as a guise to support narrow self-interest does not
alter the basic appeal to the body politic of the "fair shake." Certainly
a key problem for policy is to recognize the legitimacy of concern for
the poor and the disadvantaged, but to avoid having the rhetoric of
poverty become the servant of well-placed interests.
Unfortunately, when this happens, as it does all too frequently, the
systems for equity and efficiency become so entangled as to be almost
indistinguishable. By the time our energy industry is transformed into a
system for geographic and industrial redistribution of oil, let alone for
redistribution of income, it is no wonder that so little progress is made
toward solving the energy problem. This form of government effort to
redistribute income is subverting the very processes that produce the
income in the first place.
Returning to the concept of government's comparative advantage, our
system of income maintenance should be simplified drastically, concen-
trating on cash payments rather than the provision of in-kind benefits.
These cash payments should become the principal vehicle through which
the political process pursues the goal of equity.
Other changes are as essential if the government role in the decades
ahead is to reflect its comparative advantages and disadvantages. These
changes call for a reversal of many postwar trends, for reduction and
simplification in areas like taxes, spending, and regulation, and for reli-
ance more on the use of market incentives to get the regulatory job done.
Such changes imply a rearrangement of the political landscape since,
in the end, government is a mirror of our aspirations, our understand-
ing, ind our determination. The hope is, however, that we can follow
the idea of comparative advantage: a less comprehensive government
role can allow more concentration on areas of prime government re-
sponsibility, where first class performance is essential.665 The Role of Government: Taxes, Transfers, and Spending
3. Paul A. Samuels on
The Public Role in the Modern American Economy
This is not the first time that groups like the NBER have taken a broad
look at the cosmic future. Let us hope we are a bit luckier in the present
exercise.
One almost hesitates to mention the 1929 Recent Economic Trends,
commissioned by the confident President Herbert Hoover and blessed
by Wesley Clair Mitchell, our founder and patron saint, then at the apex
of his scholarly career. That group of economists took a careful look at
the United States economy and reported it to be in great shape with a
sunny future ahead. That was in 1929!
Then again I recall that, before World War II was over, a National
Bureau group consisting of a Harvard statistician and a* Wall Street
financier published a volume on the subject I am asked particularly to
comment on today: the future state of the government finance. It was
a sorry performance. It is easy to see in retrospect how woefully it
underestimated the scale of post-1945 fiscal activity. But even at the
time, this objective study reeked of wishful thinking and of editorializing
in favor of the conservative views of its authors. I remember my old
master Alvin Hansen commenting to me that no one alive would ever
see a federal budget less than twice this volume's predicted numbers.
And, as Hansen later explained to me when I asked him how he thought
his prewar doctrine of secular stagnation had actually worked out in the
postwar epoch: "Paul, my numbers for federal expenditure, fiscal defi-
cits, and tax revenues—which were considered so outlandish in 1939
and 1944—turned out to be far short of the actual mark. Nature never
got the chance to perform the needed experiment for us to know what
would have happened if the postwar budget had been always in balance
at a low level" (and, I may add in 1980, if the low birthrate had con-
tinued after 1939—the only trend anyone had a right to extrapolate in
1939).
So, it is well that I as a commentator am chastened by the demon-
strated complexity in forecasting the future and in understanding the
present before it has become history. But it is also well that at least some
of the scholars who have prepared the surveys that we are all to discuss
should have been bold in their speculations and should have nominated
theses for us to agree with or try to shoot down. It is part of the eclectic
diversity of the National Bureau, preserved in each of its reincarnations,
that its authors should differ in substance and style. Thus, Professor
Mansfield has cautiously reported some of the available facts about
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productivity and research, mentioned a few of the current hypotheses
some have put forward to explain them, but has eschewed advancing a
grand thesis of his own. Professor Easterlin, from the same university,
has perceived the postwar movements in birthrates through the spec-
tacles of his own self-generating every-other-generation cycle, giving his
brainchild all the rope it can use. Professor Break, whose paper surveys
my topic of government finance, has chosen to present the domestic
facts in an analytical mode, so that at least our theories can know what
it is they are purporting to explain.
What I want to do today is to examine critically some broad views
about government that people outside of economics have been hotly
debating. Here is (what, prior to hearing some of the speakers at this
conference, I thought to be) a caricature, almost a parody, of what most
businessmen believe. In a lower keyed version, but still in essentially
the same thesis, I suspect it is a view that the majority of college grad-
uates would essentially subscribe to. The thesis follows:
The Roosevelt New Deal brought in some needed reforms. But this
last half century has witnessed an overshoot of government regula-
tions, taxation, and deficit spending. The vigor of the market economy
has thereby been sapped—just as it has been in so many of the mixed
economies abroad. United States inflation, stagnation in productivity,
class struggle, and popular unrest is the inevitable consequence of the
cancerous growth of the public sector engineered by powerseeking
bureaucrats and politicians.
Britain provides an archetypical case to prove that the hand of
government withers progress and efficiency, and fails to make good
on the "equity" it promises. As well, a comparative survey of all the
mixed economies will bear out the same perverse correlation between
the usurpations of the public sector and shortfalls of economic per-
formance—Switzerland versus Sweden, Japan and West Germany ver-
sus Italy and the United States, and so forth.
Notice that I have included nothing in the above statement about the
importance of limiting government for the sake of liberty itself. A
Hayek, even if you could demonstrate to him a mixed economy where
government planning, stabilization, and redistribution really worked well,
would reject it in the same way he would reject a well-run jail. Such a
view is still a minority view with the electorate, but where it does gain
support from fellow travelers is to the degree that the actual "jails"—by
which I mean the mixed economies as we know them—are not well run.
Tasting Puddings
What I wish to do here is to display that "respect for the facts" which
Arthur Burns once proclaimed must be the National Bureau's watch-
word.
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Is any of it?
What is the cautious reading of experience on these controversial
matters?
These are not easy questions. Since time is scarce, let me reveal at
the beginning that I do not think the caricature as stated is unequivocally
supported by the historical record. That doesn't mean it's wrong. It
might be correct. But a fair-minded jury is under no compulsion to
swallow its contentions on the basis of the empirical observations avail-
able.
Wishes of Bureaucrats
Here is one part of it that I find farfetched. Bureaucrats would of
course like to have their empires grow; and politicians do prefer, other
things equal, to be elected rather than defeated. It does not follow from
this that I am able to make sense about trends, and to make good pre-
dictions, by assuming that it is the desires and psyches of Washington
inhabitants that I must look to in explaining actual political happenings.
Social security is a good instance. As George Break observes, it has
been one of the fastest growing elements of public expenditure and tax-
ation. Those numerous clerks in Baltimore have been of least impor-
tance in the process. I have known most of the head actuaries in that
program from the beginning. Their causal role has been, if not negligible,
certainly minor. Indeed it was over their objections that so many of the
evolving features have become dominant. Why then the growth? It was
immanent from the beginning—once the national decision was made to
introduce a general insurance scheme. Few of us had the imagination
and courage to extrapolate what was immanent. But that is the usual
story in these matters. My point is not that this has all been a beneficent
thing. Franco Modigliani and Martin Feldstein may turn out to be right
that the social security system is the cause of a reduced effective rate of
saving and investing in the American economy. My point is that how
Main Street and Congress feel about this matter, and not how civil ser-
vants do, is what has given us whatever it is we now have.
My old teacher, Josef Schumpeter, tried to set forth a theory of public
finance based on the realpolitik of getting elected. I welcome modern
revivals of this seminal idea. But all theories of revealed preference must
be subject to the check of comparison with empirical data. And the in-
nuendo that it is the power wishes of government officials that explains
the police state is not a hypothesis that stands up well to explain the
complexity of facts that need explaining.
Post Hoc, but...
The middle third of the twentieth century goes into the record book
as the era in which the tax share of the public sector soared. The final
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ilar acceleration. This is so, if only because of the nature of a fraction,
which has to be bounded by one. But it is also so because, as the market
sector shrinks, one can expect there will be a resistance and backlash
rather like that we have begun to see in recent years.
How has real GNP fared in this middle third of the century in which
governments grew like a cancer? Would a Hayek have predicted in 1933
that the patient would show the debilitation of cancer? Would a Schum-
peter in 1942 have written about "capitalism in an oxygen tent" on its
march to socialism? Of course. And that is what I was taught at the
University of Chicago was the likely future to look forward to after
1935.
But when we turn to the real world, we see it has been a different
story. Of course, the recoveries from the world depression consequent
upon deficit financing in North America, Germany, and elsewhere in
Europe are easy to understand in terms of short-term fluctuations. But
what Schumpeter was writing about in Capitalism, Socialism and De-
mocracy was the long pull. If he came back to Vienna, Bonn, and Cam-
bridge today, he would be as surprised as that urbane mind could admit
to, by what the Kuznetses and Denisons have measured to be the post-
war miracles of growth by the mixed economy.
Am I arguing that, because the public sector was burgeoning from
1932 to 1970, that is why world GNP outperformed the growth rates
previously witnessed under the gales of creative capitalistic destruction?
No. What I am precisely warning against in this commentary is such a
facile attempt to read into the chaos of facts the theses you want to
believe about them (theses which may even have important germs of
truth in them).
Thus, Switzerland and Sweden show almost identical paths of Kuz-
netsian progress. If I gave you their two time series blind, you couldn't
tell them apart. More than that. It is a great mistake to think that Swit-
zerland is a Walrasian economy and Sweden a totalitarian state. If you
examine the long vector of attributes of these two, you will find them
surprisingly alike; and also you will find some surprising reversals of
the usual stereotypes.
Debaters and lawyers are always trying to overstate their cases. I
recall how, just after the mid-1940s, conservative friends used to point
to Belgium and Holland. Belgium, they claimed was a market economy
and it was prospering. Holland was allegedly a controlled economy and
it was stagnating. If you inquired about the different degrees of bombing
of the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, they lost patience with your
pedantry. But of course in a few years, both economies showed marked
departures from laissez-faire; and their relative growth rates showed no
simple patterns of dominance.
What is relevant to the present session is to look at the numbers Dr.
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numbers abroad. Everyone knows that Germany and France, to say
nothing of the Low Countries and Scandinavia, have grown more in the
postwar than has the United States. Is it then the case, as the above
thesis would require, that these fast growing countries show a larger
fraction for the market economy than we do? I have just had the occa-
sion to prepare the eleventh edition of my elementary textbook Eco-
nomics. Every four years I get reeducated on the world economy, and
an economic historian could do worse—as Bob Gordon has indicated
in footnoting his paper for this conference—than to use these successive
revisions as a documentary source to chronicle both the change in events
and in beliefs about them.
What I found, when preparing a table of comparative shares of GNP
that taxes take, was that Switzerland and the United States each tax
about the same fraction of national income. That paragon of growth
and the free market, West Germany, has a larger total tax fraction than
the United States or the United Kingdom do. And Germany, unlike
America or Israel, has little call to spend on national defense. The
Netherlands and Sweden are two nations whose public sectors have
leaped above half their GNPs. Has Providence punished them for this
profligacy?
Not yet. Their growth rates have for decades been exceeding our best
performances. I happen to think that their future productivity trends
will be adversely affected by this heavy load. But that thought of mine
is not a National Budget thought: It is not a finding of statistical analy-
sis or even a deducible lemma from a compelling model; but like so
many of my best insights it is a Bayesian hunch that could never deserve
the Mitchell-Burns imprimatur. If you match your hunches against mine,
who is to be the referee to adjudicate between them?
Even Britain cannot serve as the whipping youth for the determined
empiricist. For all the talk about the "British sickness," the United
Kingdom's government's fraction of GNP expended on goods and ser-
vices has averaged out to less than those reported for the United States
in Dr. Break's tables. And, just to confuse the parable, Britain's produc-
tivity trend in the third quarter of the century turns out to have sur-
passed that of the United States—just as growth rate in the United States
production index has outperformed production growth in Switzerland
and Germany in the 1970s.
I've made my point: Only ideologues can see simple morals writ large
in historical record. The facts tell their own story, but it is not the simple
story that so many want to hear.
Welfare and Mutual Reinsurance
Thanks to earlier National Bureau authors, we have been reminded
that conventional measures of product and productivity do not capture
all the elements of welfare that the citizenry are concerned with. William670 George F. Break/George P. Shultz/Paul A. Samuelson
Nordhaus and James Tobin constructed their rough Measure of Eco-
nomic Welfare (MEW) to make clear that there are offsets to the re-
duction in productivity which may result from environmental pollution
standards and from occupational safety regulations. My neighbors and
I go to the polls and by majority vote make sure that if we should hap-
pen to be unemployed, or blind, or penuriously old, we shall still receive
some minimum of income payments. In agreement with Alan Blinder's
paper, even though the ordinary measures of income inequality—e.g.,
Gini coefficients of Lorenz curves, Pareto-curve parameters—show no
strong trends for the last three decades, it is my observation that there
has been a perceptible reduction in lifetime inequality. Fewer people do
go to bed hungry in present-day America; and life is not so short, nasty,
and brutish for the poor as I can remember it being in my youth.
None of this is accomplished in a Pareto Optimal way. From the
beginning of time such a state of thermodynamic efficiency has never
been remotely approached. If economists were to wait for that day in
which income redistributions are done in the Pareto Efficient way, they
would wait forever. And society's members would wait with them.
Economists are a minority, no more numerous than chiropractors.
Noneconomists go whole hours without thinking about Pareto Optimal-
ity. It is noneconomists who constitute our clients. We are their not-so-
efficient servants. They are our not-so-clear-thinking masters.
Once democracies decide to second-guess the outcome of the market,
the programs take on a momentum of their own. When I was a young
student of what was to come to be known as macroeconomics, we all
took for granted that F.D.R.'s new expenditures on welfare and unem-
ployment compensation would have to last only so long as the economy
remained significantly below its full employment potential. After recov-
ery was achieved, those expenditures would recede in the simple anti-
cyclical manner. That was the naive expectation I shared.
Of course it didn't happen. You might think that this was the result
of "politics"—a reflection of the weakness in the voting system that
tends to make it easier to expand the economy than to restrain and
contract it. Well, you would be wrong in thinking so. There may well
be such a political bias in the workings of the mixed economy. But what
I came to realize belatedly in the late 1930s—and it came from the
writings of Bill Haber of the University of Michigan, writings that did
not appear in refereed proper economic journals—that once society
decided that people should not fall below certain minimum levels of
well-being and income, the total of the welfare load would grow and
grow. And so it has, no longer to my surprise, these last forty years.
My Worries
I have reached the age to scold and nag. So I must not fail you.
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nomic trends that have been the trends of my times, my reason and
experience with economic models leave me with a concern. Markets are
more effective for many facets of economic activity than people have
been able to make fiats and commands be. Any new nation freed from
colonial bindings can give itself a socialist constitution and type out a
crisp Five-Year Plan. But so often, we know from experience, these
good intentions are not worth the paper they are written on.
The mixed economy is mixed. That is its strength: to mobilize for
human ends the mechanisms of the market and to police those mecha-
nisms to see that they do not wander too far away from the desired
common goals.
The market can be a strong horse under us. But every horse has its
limits. Those limits may not show up at once. A Sweden or Holland can
for a time pile onto the horse ever greater relative loads. No one is wise
enough to state exact limits beyond which the mechanism must begin to
falter. But that doesn't mean limits are not there.
The problem for the United States, I have come to think, is to move
beyond our good intentions. Our challenge is to preserve the useful fea-
tures of the market—as when we want whatever slack there is in the
economy to put effective downward pressure on prices and wage costs.
But that should not mean that we have to submit to all the thoughtless
consequences of the market's solution. To paraphrase Alfred Marshall
of ninety-five years ago, economists need to put their cool heads to the
service of their warm hearts. And that's what the American economy
itself needs urgently to do in the years ahead.
Summary of Discussion
The discussion turned first to the redistributing role of government.
Benjamin Friedman suggested that the tables on income redistribution
through government in the Break paper understate its true extent. Gov-
ernment expenditures on goods and services also have a large redistri-
butional component. Procurement policies are often targeted to achieve
specific distributional aims. Even military spending has some of this
character, as evidenced by the difficulty of removing military bases from
some Congressional districts even when the bases are not justified on
defense grounds. Friedman asserted that a realistic debate about govern-
ment would be not about the level of public goods provision but rather
about how much redistribution we want. Friedman expressed puzzlement
about the failure to debate that issue squarely. Wilbur Cohen suggested
in response that redistribution has never captured the imagination of the
noneconomist, as it is antithetical to middle class and even populist
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come through government is far less than the gross redistribution, given
the variety and often conflicting goals of redistributive programs. But
since each program has negative incentive effects, the efficiency burden
of the programs is related to the extent of gross, and not net, redistri-
bution.
In response to a question, Paul Samuelson reiterated that any inverse
correlation between government spending as a proportion of income and
the rate of economic growth, is not strong, and that part of any simple
correlation is spurious. Since public goods generally have an income
elasticity greater than one, wealthier (and presumably slower growing)
countries devote a larger share of income to public goods. Milton Fried-
man declared that these correlations would in any event understate the
true burden of government spending on economic welfare, since the in-
come statistics give equal welfare weight to public and private spending.
This is because government spending is valued at factor cost and not at
market price.
Herbert Giersch challenged Samuelson's comparison of United States
and German manufacturing growth. The German manufacturing sector
was overgrown in the 1960s because of an undervaluation of the DM
exchange rate. It thus could have been expected to decline in the 1970s.
While this happened with regard to employment, productivity growth
accelerated. A comparison of productivity growth rates between the
United States and Germany gave a picture completely different from
Samuelson's comparison.
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